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AN ATTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATION ANXIETY 
Jim Quiggins 
Nearly everyone experiences at some time difficulty in 
communicating effectively, although some individuals have 
problems more often and in more contexts than others. 
Difficulties in communicating effectively have been studied 
intensively for many years. 1 Communication inadequacy has 
been variously defined as a failure to speak where appropriate 
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(e.g., reticence and stage fright), as a high rate of non-
fluency (e.g., stuttering), as a set of behaviors that interfere 
with audience comprehension (e.g., figiting), and as a failure 
to be open with others (e.g., low self disclosure). Since 
many of these behaviors are accompanied by self reported and 
overt anxiety, 2 anxiety as a cause of communication inadequacy 
has been a major focus of attention in journals, convention 
programs, and academic departments in the speech communication 
discipline. This paper presents an analysis of communication 
anxiety that considers recent research in the area of 
attribution theory and offers suggestions for the development 
of theory and treatment. 
Current Treatment Problems 
Many treatments of communication inadequacy are designed 
to reduce anxiety. These include massed practice, peer feedback, 
and behavior modification. All have had varying degrees of 
success. One reason for differences in the outcomes of treat-
ment programs regardless of their content is that criteria for 
success differ. As cook 3describes evaluation, some programs 
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1re designed and evaluated in accord with a "medical" model 
vrhereas others use a "tailoring" model. The medical model 
1ssumes that the program treats the cause of a problem that has 
1 number of symptoms. A wide variety of symptoms and side 
~ffects are measured, some long after treatment and in quite 
iifferent contexts. For example, the effects of a class in 
;peech anxiety might be evaluated by measuring self-reported 
~ase in making new friends six months later. The tailoring 
rodel is used by those who wi~h to tailor a specific ~rogram 
>f treatment to a specific set of behaviors. With this model, 
:he behavioral objectives of the treatment, rather than broader 
>bjectives, are measured. Thus, the effects of repetition in 
:he speech anxiety class might be measured by immediately retest-
.ng students' fluency on the specific oral tasks they practiced 
luring class sessions. Obviously, it is less difficult to demon-
.trate the success of treatment when outcomes are identified and 
teasured in accord with the tailoring model than with the medical 
lOdel . 4 This would explain why Paul's research on disensitization, 
. sing the tailoring model of problem identification and outcome 
.easurement, demonstrated a very high effectiveness for desen-
itization, whereas Kleinsasser's, 5using a medical model, did 
ot. 
One reason for the choice of a medical model of evaluation 
s theoretical preference. Those for whom communication anxiety 
s a general trait with many behavioral symptoms are likely to 
hoose the medical model, even though positive outcomes are 
arder to demonstrate. But it is now known that neither com-
unication inadequacy, nor anxiety, are entities that a person 
6 haS or does not have. - communication dysfunctions may be 
caused by insufficient or inappropriate learning, by physical 
defects, by an unwillingness to share the common definition of 
appropriate behavior (as when a T-Group member refuses to talk 
because he rejects the openness norm) or simply by a misunder-
standing of what is desirable communication behavior in a 
particular situation. Furthermore, anxiety in any one person 
varies greatly with the psychological situation, the setting 
and time. This being the case, an anxiety reduction treatment 
may not help those persons who communicate inadequately for 
reasons other than anxiety or whose behavioral problem is un-
related to outcome goals of the treatment. Treatment programs 
designed to reduce anxiety ought to be effective in improving 
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communication adequacy just with those persons whose inadequacy 
is either caused or exacerbated by anxiety and whose inadequacy 
is actually related to the behavior focused upon in treatment 
~nd measured later. Such programs will be developed, however, 
)nly to the extent that the concept of communication anxiety, 
Ltself, is well understood. Two important questions to be 
lnswered are: (1) under what conditions do anxiety states 
!ause specific communication problems, and (2) what are the 
:auses of these anxiety states and their persistence. 
~onceptual Difficulties 
Current conceptions of communication anxiety as a general 
ttribute limit the development of tailored treatments and 
estrict more sophisticated theory and research. The develop-
ent of effective treatment for communication anxiety as well 
as theory, depends upon a more complex definition of the con-
cept. Although communication theorists have drawn upon 
research in experimental psychology that demonstrates how 
anxiety affects performance 7 (i.e., anxiety arousal interfe~s 
with the performance of complex tasks and causes avoidance of 
situations which are associated with anxiety), they have not 
as yet been much influenced by empirical and theoretical 
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advances in social psychology. A body of literature that deals 
with inference and the assignment of casualty--known as 
attribution theory--offers a multi-dimensional conceptualization 
of anxiety. When this theory is applied to communication 
anxiety, it may better account for its occurrence and persistence 
and provide important implications for measurement and treatment. 
Communication Anxiety as Multidimensional 
A tendency to be anxious in communication situations may be 
specific to only a few settings (e.g., speaking in public) or may 
be characteristic in many different communication situations, or 
may even be part of a generalized anxiety which is aroused in 
many facets of an individual's life. 8 Anxiety, therefore, may be 
:onceived along a continuum of pervasiveness. Many theorists 
impose the terms "state" and "trait" on each end of the con-
tinuum. Because of the frequent confusion in both technical 
~nd everday language we should briefly distinguish between 
;tate and trait anxiety. There are, however, far more thorough 
ind adequate treatments of this issue available. 9 
State anxiety is used to describe anxious arousal to a 
;pecific group of stimuli, say interpersonal interaction, or 
8 
public speaking, or physical danger. Many people, for example, 
experience anxiety when speaking before a large audience but 
not in a small group. Researchers whose concern is primarily 
with state anxiety emphasize the importance of identifying 
situations that evoke anxiety in many individuals. Trait 
anxiety refers to a relatively enduring personality trait 
whereby an individual is predisposed to respond with anxiety 
behavior to a wide range of stimuli. Here the emphasis is 
on individual differences. The specific situations that arouse 
the anxious response are assumed to be not easily identified and 
are of secondary concern in treatment. 
Even this state-trait conception of anxiety is too simplistic. 
~ecent studies of anxiety support an interaction model of anxiety 
~hereby persons are assumed to be more or less predisposed to be 
1nxious in particular situations. For example, one person might 
>e inclined to be anxious in situations where threat to self-
!Steem is possible; another might be disposed to anxiety only 
.n strange or new situations (both would tend to score high on 
L unidimensional test) . 
Whether or not communication anxiety is unidimensional is 
•erhaps so far unknown, but certainly, recent experiments raise 
he possibility that it is not. 10 Endler has shown that there are 
t least four different kinds of trait anxiety (interpersonal, 
hysical danger, ambiguous, and daily routine), each of which can 
e manifested in at least three different response modes (approach, 
voidance, and autonomic). This work suggests that, pervasive-
ess held constant, people who are predisposed to react with 
voidance of public speaking for example may be quite different 
from those who avoid interpersonal interaction in small 
groups. Perhaps the various terms for communication 
anxiety, such as apprehension, reticence and stage fright, 
actually refer to different trait-state continua. 
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Pervasiveness (trait-state), situation type, and 
response mode are thus three categories of communication 
anxiety important to consider in developing theory_ and 
treatment. A fourth category (or more accurately, set of 
categories), cognitive attribution, is undoubtedly of equal 
importance even though consideration of attribution phenomena 
has not yet much influenced theorists, researchers and prac-
tioners in the field of communication anxiety. 
Anxiety as an Emotion 
Attribution dimensions define the extent to which a person 
congitively labels an aroused physical state as the emotion of 
anxiety and, also, the extent to which he attributes his state 
of emotion to some factor within himself, such as a personality 
trait, or to some situational factor, such as an unsympathetic 
audience. Another consideration is whether or not some be-
havioral communication difficulty is attributed to anxiety. 
All three attribution processes will, we argue, affect the 
development and persistence of communication anxiety and the 
effectiveness of various treatments for it. 
Recognition of the first process followed the discovery 
that anxiety, itself, has at least two components. These 
components are (1) autonomic arousal, and (2) the cognitive 
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assignment of the label "anxiety" to that arousal, which in 
interaction may contribute to the individual's behavioral 
problems. 
Arousal, whatever its cause, is known to increase the rate 
of responding whether responses are appropriate or inappropri-
ate. Futhermore, arousing stimuli are distracting, drawing 
attention away from task performance to the salient arousing 
stimuli and to the person's own physiological state. Anxiety 
as it is usually defined, however, is more than arousal 
because it is perceived by the individual to be a negative 
emotional state. The negative effects of arousal are much 
exacerbated when arousal is defined by the person as 
anxiety. In this case, the drive has a directive (i.e., to 
lower arousal or avoid increasing it) which may compete with 
task requirements and is a socially undesirable emotional 
state. This is similar to what Wendell Johnson referred to 
some time ago as "semantogenic disability." As Johnson 
suggested, 
.The number of weaknesses 'available' to 
most of us is probably great enough to provide a 
pausible disability for almost any occasion. And 
we can be direct about it, 'using' a sore throat 
to avoid a speaking engagement, or we can1£e subtle 
and discover that we have an ailing back. 
This does not mean, however, that all such semantogenic 
"ailments" are produced at will and with full awareness of 
the motives involved. On the contrary, it is the non~wareness 
that often causes exacerbation. Moreover, if the individual 
labe~a large number of arousal states as anxiety and feels 
that it reflects a characteristic of his personality, his 
self concept will be affected negatively. 
Recently some research has focused upon the conditions 
under which a state of arousal becomes attributed as an 
emotion. This research was stimulated by Schachter's con-
ceptualization of emotion12which is concerned with the 
attribution of cause to physiological arousal. Schachter 
and others contend that a straightforward reinforcement 
model does not account for states of intense emotion, parti-
cularly when they persist over time. Love, hate, anger and 
anxiety are not necessarily responses to actual rewarding 
or punishing stimuli, nor is it possible to predict what 
emotion will be felt by an objective analysis of the situa-
tion. People may fall in love with those who punish them, 
hate those who comfort them, and feel communication anxiety 
even when their receivers are sympathetic. 13 
Schachter proposes that attributed emotion depends upon 
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a state of physiological arousal being identified by the 
individual as an emotional state. Moreover, arousal alone is 
not sufficient to cause a feeling of emotion, but does provoke 
a need to explain the cause of the arousal. If an individual 
perspires, feels flushed, or feels "butterflies in his stomach" 
when talking with a new acquaintance, for example, he will 
search to find the cause for his physical symptoms. In doing 
so, the individual looks to his environment for the explanation 
of his upset state. If the cues in the situation indicate 
that his arousal is simply a physical response {such as due to 
illness or to drugs), he will look no further for an explanation 
and will not attribute his arousal as emotion. In the absence 
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of a known physical cause, the individual will find a reason 
for his physical symptoms in the setting, or in the behavior 
of others, or in his personality. This attribution of cause 
permits the individual to attach an emotional label to his 
physical state. For example, a speaker who is aroused and 
perceives his audience as unfriendly may identify his feeling 
as anxiety. In future similar circumstances the assignment 
of the anxiety label may persist regardless of the nature of 
the audience, so that the individual may now attribute his 
anxiety to something within himself. On the other hand, if a 
speaker is aroused but views his audience as supportive, he 
may label his arousal as excitement and enjoy the experience, 
as well as subsequent similar experiences. 
Schachter and Singer14in a landmark study, increased the 
physiological arousal of subjects by giving them epinephrine 
(a drug which causes increased heart rate, palmar sweating, a 
flushed feeling, etc.). Those who knew they had been given a 
drug which caused their physical state reported they did not 
feel emotional. Those who were unaware of the drug's arous-
ing effects, however, did say they felt an emotion. Moreover, 
the specific emotional label they attached to their physical 
state depended upon situational cues. When another person, 
a confederate, was euphorically playing around in the room 
(e.g., flying paper airplanes or throwing paper wads) the 
subjects reported they felt happy. If the confederate 
became angry when asked to answer a questionnaire which 
contained personal items and stamped from the room, however, 
the subject likewise reported he felt angry. In the same 
circumstances, subjects without epinephrine did not report 
as much emotion. 
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The results of this study can be generalized to com-
munication anxiety. Autonomic arousal is present at relative 
levels where we communicate with others because the encounter 
generally requires attentiveness, concentration, and activity. 
Furthermore, since each time we interact we are implicitly 
seeking validation, 15the possibility of embarrassment, rejec-
tion or negative feedback from others heightens the _possibility 
of arousal. As noted above, this state of arousal may or may 
not be attributed to anxiety depending on previous experiences 
and the anticipation of outcomes of the encounter by the 
individual. Expectations about the relationship will affect 
how situational cues are perceived and whether the individual 
labels his arousal as anxiety will depend upon the interaction 
of actual situational cues with his perceptions of them. The 
apparent anxiety of others, difficult task requirements, 
negative feedback, or even subtle cues from a leader that the 
individual is expected to be anxious may lead to the attribu-
tion of anxiety. Since many interpersonal situations are 
likely to be ambiguous in terms of social norms and 
appropriate behavior (i.e., politeness norms and social roles 
may disguise actual feelings), an individual's expectations 
about himself and others should heavily influence what emotion 
he attributes to himself. What if an individual characteristi-
cally assigns labels such as "nervousness," "fear," "anxiety," 
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etc. to quite normal ar~usal which could have just as well been 
defined as "enthusism," "excitement," "surprise," and so on? 
People who expect to fail in gaining the approval of others, 
for example, may typically label arousal as "anxiety" when 
engaged in a social situation when the real reason for the 
arousal may have been another's unusual friendliness or 
physical attractiveness. Thus, a person's expectations when 
entering a relationship or encounter, as well as his self-
concept, are important factors in the self-identification 
or labeling of arousal states when communicating; they deter-
mine, along with situational factors, whether he feels 
exhilarated and thrilled, simply excited, or dread. 
Attribution of Trait vs. State 
Just as theorists are likely to blame communication 
anxiety more or less on dispositional or situational factors, 
individuals experiencing anxiety will also do so. Theories 
of attribution developed by such theorists as Fritz Heider 
and Harold Kelley16are useful for explaining, not just how 
the emotional state of communication anxiety develops in 
a particular situation, but also in understanding why some 
people have a predisposition to be anxious in particular 
communication settings. 
In all versions of attribution theory, individuals are 
assumed to interpret and explain their world. The theory 
assumes that people are motivated to assign cause for behavior 
so they can better understand their world. Heider refers to 
this process as the "naive analysis of behavior," suggesting 
that we are all naive psychologists. His version of 
attribution theory is concerned with how observers explain 
the behavior of others, but several authors have extended 
the theory to examine the causal interpretations that 
17 individuals apply to themselves. There is experimental 
support for the notion · that we attribute to ourselves, not 
just emotions as in Schacter's theory, but also attitudes, 
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beliefs, and personal dispositions. For example, we seem to 
attribute to ourselves a particular degree of ability by 
observing our own behavior, just as we infer the emotions, 
attitudes, abilities and dispositions of others by observing 
their behavior. 
The Attribution of Attitude and Motivation 
Bern, in attempting to provide an alternative interpreta-
tion for cognitive dissonance, suggested our behavior may 
predispose our attitude rather than vice versa. For example, 
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we will say we like brown beans if we always eat them. In 
the same manner, we may believe that we enjoy public speaking 
or one-to-one interaction because we do a great deal of it. 
This is a form of psycho-logic based on the common assumption 
that people act in accord with their beliefs and motives. The 
same sort of logic causes an individual to infer a lower 
degree of personal enjoyment for communicating if his behavior 
is required by his job or other external demands. If there 
is sufficient justification in the environment for his speak-
ing in public, for example, he is less likely to attribute his 
behavior (i.e., speaking) to personal predilections. The 
perception of high personal choice to engage in communication, 
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therefore, may promote a positive regard for doing so, if 
it is actually performed. If not, high perceived choice 
would lead to the attribution that he did not think it would 
be effective or that he avoided speaking for any other number 
of dispositional reasons. One of these, of course, includes 
being too anxious to communicate. 
Conversely, forced communication should reduce the 
tendency to infer that a person communicates because he likes 
to do so, and having made that inference, it will be much more 
probable that the individual will attribute his states of arousal 
to anxiety or some other emotional state. Once the anxiety 
attribution has been made, chances are the person will choose 
not to communicate. In that event, he will likely develop a 
negative attitude toward communicating. We now have a per-
petuative cycle such that the greater the anxiety, the greater 
the inference that one fails to communicate because of an 
internal emotional state; and the greater the inference that 
one does not enjoy communicating or is not motivated to do so, 
the greater the likelihood of further reluctance to speak or 
communicate in similar situations. 
In sum, communication anxiety is likely to develop when 
the person attributes his communication behavior to a negative 
attitude or low motivation. These internal states, in turn, 
are probable attributions when one perceives he has chosen not 
to communicate or communicated with little choice. The 
perception of choice, of course, does not necessarily reflect 
actual choice. 
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The Attribution of Communication Ability or Adequacy 
An attribution of little personal desire to communicate 
is, of course, not the only source of communication anxiety. 
Attribution theory suggests that the attribution of a stable, 
internal cause for failure in communication encounters (i.e., 
low ability or lack of skill) will also increase the likeli-
hood that a person may consider himself to suffer from 
communication anxiety. 
Weiner et. a1. 19contend that attributions made by 
observers for success or failure may be classified into broad 
classifications, internal and external. Dispositional factors 
within the individual such as his ability or motivation are 
classified as internal causes of behavior, and luck on the 
other hand, are examples of external causes or influences. Of 
the two general dispositional factors (motivation and ability), 
ability is considered by most people to be the most stable. 20 
Furthermore, consistent performance (successful or unsuccessful) 
is most often seen by observers as due to the actor's individual 
ability, wheras, inconsistent performance is more likely to be 
attributed to factors such as intent or effort. 
This same sort of process occurs when an individual makes 
attributions about his own behavior. People assess the likeli-
hood that success or failure was caused primarily by the 
situation or by internal attributes or by both. They also 
attribute cause to variable factors, such as luck or motivation, 
or to more stable factors such as, difficulty of the endeavor 
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or ability. Several studies support the notion that self-
observers characteristically attribute causality to aspects of 
the situation while observers of other's behavior tend to 
attribute causality to the individual's disposition. 2 l 
One reason the self observer may place greater emphasis 
upon situational elements in explaining his own behavior is 
because the ability to respond differentially to varying 
situations enhances his sense of control of the environment. 
There are also other cues which a person might use to assign 
cause for his own behavior. 
Past experience in similar situations and observations of 
others create expectations against which an individual may 
judge his performance and determine its cause. When people 
consistently perform or communicate "better" or "worse" than 
others, the inference is likely to be that the task or 
situation determined the outcome than it is that something 
within is responsible. Attribution theory predicts, therefore, 
that the greatest self-attribution of high or low ability will 
occur when a person invariably succeeds or fails more than 
others do in the same or closely similar situations. 
Most individuals are moderately successful in communicat-
ing. They seldom even think about why they are successful, 
except perhaps when they are unexpectedly highly successful, 
at which time they will probably attribute their success to 
their own efforts. Likewise, if they happen to "fail" un-
expectedly, they will probably attribute the outcome to 
unusual task difficulty, luck, or a momentary lapse of 
effort. For example: "I received an A on my oral report 
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because I kept my cool," or "Sure I did poorly! Anybody would 
if people were shouting questions at you the whole time." The 
obvious general principle is that a majority of consistent 
successful experiences allows an individual to "shake off" 
occasional failure as due to bad luck, poor timing, or any 
other plausible external factor. 
What about individuals who have not been successful in 
their attempts to communicate and may even have been con-
sistently unsuccessful as they see it. In this case, the 
self-attributions tend to be reversed. That is, successful 
experiences are the unexpected and will most likely be 
attributed to good luck or an exceptionally easy task or 
situation, whereas, failure will be attributed to personal, 
internal inadequacies. For example: "I only got the job 
because it doesn't require any contact with people," or "I 
knew they wouldn't hire me because I'm not good at talking 
to strangers." 
Furthermore, the consistently "unsuccessful" communi-
cator may make unusual distorted attributions of causality for 
other's behavior and communication outcomes. That is, the 
individual may have an inflated view of other's superiority 
in situations in which he himself characteristically feels 
inadequate or inferior. He may perceive others as consider-
ably more successful or having more responsibility for their 
success than even others perceive themselves. Successful 
experiences of others as he perceives them, seem accountable 
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to the person's dispositional or internal factors while 
failures are attributed to environmental or external factors. 
As these kinds of attributions continue, the individual's 
self-confidence and self-esteem may become progressively lower, 
and he will become more anxious about communicating. He 
attributes more anxiety to himself when he does communicate 
or even contemplates doing so and avoidance behavior becomes 
the only apparent way to maintain any self-respect. This 
creates a cycle of intrapersonal mistrust which is actually 
self-defeating to maintenance of self-esteem and serves to 
promote more internal attribution for failure. Anxiety and 
demonstrable lack of skill each provides evidence of more 
general failure as a person, and the assumption of low self-
worth in turn increases the likelihood of anxiety and failure. 
In most cases individuals who experience communication 
apprehension and make these kinds of attributions resign them-
selves to the "fact" that they are poor communicators, and are, 
except in isolated situations with people they perceive as 
accepting. Although in the latter situations their communica-
tion is usually unrestrained, spontaneous, and open, they are 
convinced that they are not effective "talkers." They persist 
in attributing nonapprehensive behavior in isolated relation-
ships as externally caused. It may be that an individual can 
become so resigned to his self-concept that he begins to 
accept it, which could strengthen his self-esteem and suggests 
that he may "grow out of" his anxiety. On the .other hand, most 
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of these people experience continually greater dissatisfaction 
with themselves and their ability (as they perceive it) causing 
them psychological discomfort and continued withdrawal from 
varied relationships. 
The Persistence of Ne·gative Attributions 
It has been suggested that emotionally negative attributions 
concerning motive and ability cause an individual to act in 
ways that further exaggerate anxiety and lend to increase fail-
ure or avoidance in communicative situations. Both avoidance 
and perceptions of inadequacy in turn prompt the making of more 
negative attributions. There are two other factors that also 
contribute to this self-fulfilling prophecy: the lack of con-
sensual validation and negative validation. 
Since social reality cannot ordinarily be measured with 
yardsticks, tape measures, or weights, individuals use others 
to discover what is correct or incorrect, right or wrong, good 
or bad, appropriate or inappropriate and so forth. This social 
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comparison process also is used to help attribute causes for 
behavior and to validate self-perceptions. The behavior of 
others and their responses to an individual give some idea as 
to whether a person's inference about "reality"--including 
himself--are correct or not. Positive appraisals serve to 
enhance self-esteem and may force reexamination of personal 
defeat or failure so as to encourage external or variable 
attributions of cause, rather than stable internal attribution. 
If an individual avoids seeking the opinion of others because 
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he expects and fears negative evaluation, he also eliminates 
the possibility of receiving the positive validation he so 
desperately needs. 
In situations where the cause for a negative outcome 
is construed as internal and reflecting an inferiority, an 
individual may avoid social interaction and exposure of what 
he preceives as an embarrassing or shameful attribute. The 
failure or inability to use social consensus to check out 
his evaluations can lead to further self-ascriptions of 
~bnormality and personal inadequacy that can be profoundly 
jebilitating. This condition also promotes an oversensiti-
vity concerning the individual's own behavior, such that the 
:ommunicator may continually monitor his own behavior and tend 
to interpret behaviors that are common and normal to be ab-
1ormal. This pattern of response is similar to what has also 
leen referred to as "social alienation." Giffin has synthe-
3ized a number of alienation studies including research which 
1as investigated the relationship between social alienation 
1nd speech anxiety. In the synthesis article of his research 
1nd other, Giffin points out the characteristic patterns of 
;ocial alienation and communication anxiety as low self-image, 
.ow trust of others, high motivation to avoid failure, and 
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.ow mot1vat1on to ac 1eve success. As we note ear 1er, 
~hese attributions of inadequacy create a cycle whereby inter-
.ction is avoided for fear of confirming the inadequacy, but 
.he avoidance itself may be perceived as verification anyway. 
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Suppose, however, that an individual does not yet have 
a firm attribution for his communication inadequacy. Perhaps 
he is simply seeking help for inadequacy that he attributes 
to a simple lack of skill and is not yet attributed to severe 
anxiety or inability. In this case, negative feedback from 
others will exaggerate the mildly negative attribution. If 
others label him as anxious or hostile he has received social 
validation for a negative trait as well as an emotional ex-
planation for the arousal he experiences when communicating. 
The following postulates taken from this analysis provide 
a concise summary of the conceptual position offered in this 
paper. 
1. Communication anxiety is a situation-specific emotion 
and is therefore, multi-dimensional in its conceptual 
nature with cognitive attributions of causality for 
arousal and for communication behavior or skills as 
important dimensions. 
2. Individuals who tend to experience communication 
anxiety in a given situation will characteristically 
attribute the cause for their own and others success 
or failure as related to the situation differently 
than those who do not tend to experience communication 
anxiety. Specifically: 
a) Personal self-success will be perceived as caused 
primarily by external or situational factors: 
b) Personal self-failure will be perceived as caused 
primarily by internal or dispositional factors: 
c) Other's success will be perceived as caused 
primarily by internal or dispositional attributes 
of the person: 
d) Other's failure will be perceived as caused by 
external or situational factors rather than the 
person's dispositional attributes. 
3. Individuals who tend to experience communication anxiety 
will characteristically assign more labels with a 
negative valence to their physiological arousal than will 
individuals who do not tend to experience communication 
anxiety. 
24 
4. Persistent labeling of behavior or arousal as "anxiety" 
or similar negative labels will exacerbate the phe-
nomenon and establish a cycle of additional dysfunctional 
behavior and cognitive attribution. 
Implications for Measurement and Treatment of Communication Anxiety 
The implications of this reasoning for current methods of 
neasurement and treatment of communication anxiety are that these 
nethods may provide some people with a negative attribution or 
Label and in fact exacerbate the very problem which the treat-
nent is designed to reduce. Tests for communication apprehension 
)r anxiety which have items concerning specific states of arousal 
(e.g., palmar sweating when speaking) and specific behaviors (e.g., 
1esitations or nonfluencies) may lead an individual to conclude 
:hat if these attributes are characteristic of his state while he 
:ommunicates that he has something known as "communication 
tnxiety." That is, the measurement may be reactive in that it 
:upplies a dispositional label for symptoms and difficulties when 
Ln external attribution may not only be more functional but more 
.ppropriate, since the situation described by the test item is 
enerally arousing for everyone. 
Therapy or treatment for communication anxiety may also lead 
.o a greater internal attribution of communication inadequacy, 
ince the treatment assumes the person "has" an anxiety problem 
nd, further, by focusing on what he feels and does, assumes that 
he problem is caused by him rather than by his environment. Treat-
ent techniques that are in themselves of little help mayexacer-
ate the problem because anxiety that fails to respond to treatment 
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seems decidely serious. Finally, the tendency for observers 
to attribute the behavior of others to dispositional traits 
rather than to situational factors may lead to dispositionally 
inclined feedback by therapists, teachers and peers. 24 For 
example, treatment of communication anxiety through strictly 
T-group training methods may cause an individual to make more 
internal attributions for his inadequacy because in giving 
feedback group members will tend to see another's state as 
internally caused. This information will cause the individual 
to feel more responsible for his inadequacies but not necess-
airly more prepared to deal with them. 
Some might argue that recognition of one's problem is a 
necessary basis for successful treatment. The attribution 
theorists, however, would counter that some forms of recogni-
tion are dysfunctional instead. Valins and Nisbett25 suggest 
that under certain circumstances people may develop disposition-
al explanations for their behavior when situational explanations 
may be more appropriate. Citing case examples from personal 
accounts by John Neale and work by Ross, Rodin, and Zimbardo26 
and Davison, 27 they argue that emotional disorders often result 
from inappropriate attributions and that by providing a patient 
with a "normal" explanation for his behavior, his dysfunctional 
behaviors or attitudes may disappear. They even suggest that 
this kind of reattribution, or assessment therapy does not 
necessarily require a therapist. Reattributions are possible 
simply through interaction with friends who offer different 
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interpretations to the actor for his own behavior or feelings. 
For example, an individual might be convinced by them that his 
glibness with intimates reflects his true self more than does 
his lack of interaction in class. 
Since the anxiety experienced has two components, the 
physiological and the cognitive (through attributional processes 
and label attachment}, the treatment should attack both aspects. 
'd 1 d . d . . . 28 h t' The w1 e y use systemat1c esens1t1zat1on approac opera 1ng 
from a conditioning model, focuses primarily on the physiologi-
cal state. While this treatment may redu~e autonomic arousal, 
dysfunctional and inappropriate attributions may persist. 
Futhermore, the newly acquired lack of arousal produced by the 
conditioning may be attributed to the systematic desensitization 
as an external factor, realizing no re-identification of the 
emotion reported by the apprehensive individual. Perhaps the most 
important aspect of the treatment is that any progress in terms 
of alleviating the anxiety must be attributed by the patient to 
his own ability or effort and not to external forces. 
With the exception of a few studies, the discovery of the 
relationship of attribution processes with communication anxiety 
29 
remains relatively unexplored. Theoretically the existence of 
a relationship has merit, and research in related areas has sub-
stantiated the importance of causal attributions in understanding 
human behavior. 
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